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Abstract: As new and developing technologies impact public and 
private life, rhetoricians would be remiss to overlook the 
deliberative rhetorics that justify their development, 
implementation, use-value, and impact. Using the 2013 joint 
congressional hearing “Next Generation Computing and Big Data 
Analytics” as an example, I argue that justificatory rhetorics about 
technology intersect with rhetoric from technology, obscuring 
information vital to critical deliberation. I demonstrate that the 
expert witnesses at this hearing draw upon rhetoric traditionally 
associated with American industrialization. Doing so allows them 
to articulate Big Data as a resource situated upon a metaphorical, 
American landscape and thus encourages the public to treat it as a 
natural resource that must be exploited for the betterment of the 
nation. Ultimately, I argue the use of this rhetoric dissuades 
critical analysis of the worth of Big Data and investigation of its 
technical aspects. This raises troubling questions about the ability 
of rhetoric about technology to both veil and guides what the 
public accepts as ethical rhetoric from technology. 
 
Keywords: big data, rhetoric of technology, Congress, middle 
landscape 
Introduction  
On April 24, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Science, Space, and Technology held a joint hearing titled Next 
Generation Computing and Big Data Analytics (hereafter referred 
to as NGC). The stated purpose of this hearing was to “examine how 
advancements in information technology and data analytics enable 
private and public-sector organizations to utilize mass volumes of 
data to provide greater value to their customers and citizens, 
spurring new product and service innovations” (NGC, 2013, p. 3). 
The unofficial but well-known purpose of this hearing, however, 
was to deliberate on federal funding of Big Data—at the time a 
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priority of the Obama administration (IEEE-USA Staff, 2013). 
Three expert witnesses were called upon by the subcommittee to 
justify federal spending on Big Data. These witnesses were asked to 
“describe private and public Big Data research and development 
efforts; applications of Big Data initiatives; and management 
challenges” (NGC, 2013, p. 7). Advocating for federal funding of Big 
Data, these witnesses addressed the subcommittee with rhetoric 
rich in narratives highlighting the virtuous, utopic, and mythic aura 
of data analytic technology.  
As new and developing technologies impact public and private 
life, rhetoricians would be remiss to overlook the deliberative 
discourses that justify their development, implementation, use-
value, and expected impact. Carolyn Miller suggests that the 
rhetoric of technology is comprised of three main discourses: 1) 
rhetoric about technology, which concerns representations of 
technology in public forums; 2) rhetoric within technology, which 
concerns “private, proprietary discourse by which technological 
work gets done”; and 3) rhetoric from technology, which concerns 
how technological thought patterns can come to pervade society 
(1998, p. 307). In this essay, I use NGC to inquire into the 
relationship between rhetoric about technology and rhetoric from 
technology. Miller describes this relationship as one of “push” and 
“pull”: rhetoric and technology are pushed along by external factors 
while simultaneously pulling us along with them, asking us “to do 
certain things . . . in certain ways” (2010, p. ix–x). On one hand, 
rhetoric about technology pushes technological design via the 
demands created by public knowledge about technology and how 
public deliberations represent technology. On the other hand, 
rhetoric from technology emerges from the design of technological 
systems, constraining what we can reasonably expect from a 
technology by way of its affordances and encouraging us to mold 
our thoughts to its logic. At its core, then, the relationship between 
rhetoric about technology and rhetoric from technology is one 
marked by the tension that exists between the freedom of 
deliberative discourses about technology and what Jacques Ellul 
(1964) terms la technique—the force that “clarifies, rationalizes, 
and arranges” the human world to adapt it to the needs of 
technological systems (pp. 5–6).           
While rhetoric’s potential as a counterbalance to technical logic is 
clear, in this essay I look toward rhetoric from technology’s ability 
to appropriate rhetoric about technology, thereby impairing 
rhetoric about technology’s capacity to keep technical logic in 
check. To illustrate this, I examine the rhetoric used by NGC’s 
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expert witnesses to justify Big Data funding. I demonstrate that the 
expert witnesses’ rhetoric about Big Data stymies inquiry into Big 
Data technology’s technical dimensions by drawing upon a 
tradition of justificatory myths and narratives that recycle 
longstanding American cultural narratives and beliefs about 
technology. Specifically, I contend that the expert witnesses’ 
rhetoric about Big Data descends from what Leo Marx (1964) terms 
the American “middle-landscape”—a system of beliefs that suggests 
that not wasting productive capability is a patriotic duty and a 
moral necessity (p. 87). Ultimately, I submit that, by alluding to this 
mythic landscape, proponents of Big Data technology impede 
deliberation that is pertinent to a strong democratic approach to 
technological development (Sclove, 1995, pp. 25–57). In doing so, 
they demonstrate how rhetoric about technology can be 
appropriated by rhetoric from technology, resonating with the logic 
of technical systems and veiling their unsavory affordances. 
Why Next Generation Computing and Big Data 
Analytics? 
NGC’s timing and venue make it a remarkable example of the 
deliberative rhetorics that justify Big Data. The hearing itself was 
held amidst the Obama administration’s Big Data Research and 
Development Initiative. Announced on March 29, 2012, slightly 
over a year before NGC, this initiative sought to improve the U.S.’s 
“ability to extract knowledge and insights from large and complex 
collections of digital data” in order “to help solve some of the 
nation’s most pressing challenges” (The White House). To achieve 
these goals, the administration sought to develop infrastructure, 
use that infrastructure efficiently, train a knowledgeable workforce, 
and work with government agencies that have a vested interest in 
the development of Big Data (The White House, 2012). John P. 
Holden, director of the White House’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy during 2013, spoke on behalf of the initiative, 
claiming, “In the same way that past Federal investments in 
information-technology R&D led to dramatic advances in 
supercomputing and the creation of the Internet . . . [this initiative] 
promises to transform our ability to use Big Data for scientific 
discovery, environmental and biomedical research, education, and 
national security” (qtd. in Scola, 2013). Holden’s unwavering 
support is indicative of the administration’s general attitude toward 
Big Data during the early 2010s. 
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By the beginning of 2013, the Big Data Initiative was a year old. 
There was a felt need to justify its rapid consumption of public 
funds. On April 10, 2013, the Obama administration proposed a 
federal budget for the 2014 fiscal year that included $142.8 billion 
of R&D spending—a plan that increased research funding by 9.2% 
(Pinholster, 2013). When the budget passed, agencies with 
decidedly Big Data-friendly agendas received dramatic funding 
increases. For example, the National Institute of Health received 
$471 million in new funding. The National Science Foundation’s 
lavish 9.2% budget increase included $155 million dedicated to 
developing cyberinfrastructure (Science News Staff, 2013). Budget 
increases for Big Data-related work were not, however, limited to 
the 2014 fiscal year. By April 15, 2015, FCW, an outlet that reports 
on federal technology policy, reported that government agencies 
were drastically overspending on Big Data research (Lutton, 2015). 
These funding increases strongly suggest the wild success of 
rhetoric used to justify and promote the Big Data Initiative.  
Held on April 24, 2013, NGC represents a watershed moment for 
the Big Data Initiative when executive budget requests came under 
congressional review. NGC situated its participants at a rhetorical 
bottleneck where their suasory skill would necessarily and 
significantly impact the momentum of Big Data technology. Miller 
(1994) reminds us that kairos—the rhetorical idea of an opportune 
moment—is of the utmost importance when it comes to 
understanding the rhetoric of technology (p. 83). Because kairos in 
the rhetoric of technology is fundamentally about “creating 
opportunities for opportunity,” it must take advantage of 
immediately available spatial and temporal imagery in order to 
convincingly forecast the future (Miller, 1994, pp. 83–84, 94). 
Building on Miller, J. Blake Scott suggests that a convincing 
construal of kairos by advocates of industry and technology allows 
for a measure of control over what are typically indeterminable 
risks. NGC’s moment—two weeks after the 2013 budget was 
released, one year after the beginning of the Big Data Initiative, and 
on the heels of the decade when digital technology became 
ubiquitous—enabled its expert witnesses to craft successful 
narratives drawn from enthymematic assumptions unique to the 
moment and indicative of how Big Data technology is typically 
justified. Even NGC’s use of the phrase “Next Generation” alludes 
to the kairotic felicity of the moment, as the notion of a generation 
suggests a “predictable trajectory of increasing technical capacities” 
and “the arrival of a qualitatively and decisively different moment” 
(Miller, 1994, p. 85). In this context, the rhetoric of NGC’s expert 
witnesses easily resonated with the hearing’s timing, emphasizing 
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chosen narratives about Big Data—particularly those that cast it as 
necessary and inevitable. Because NGC was a rhetorical bottleneck, 
these narratives elucidate the rhetorical strategies used by Big 
Data’s apologists and underscore the importance of analyzing the 
hearing closely. 
NGC is also worth investigating because of its venue: a 
Congressional subcommittee. Here, we must consider that very 
little substantive debate takes place on the floor of Congress 
(Fitzpatrick, 1941, pp. 251–2). Instead, “Proposals are more 
thoroughly investigated and debated within specialized committees, 
and the recommendations of those committees often determine the 
character and outcome of floor deliberations” (Kauffman, 1994, p. 
93). Cynthia Cooper (1996) notes that, since their inception, 
“subcommittee meetings have been an important tool for 
information gathering essential to informed decision making” (p. 
11). Because of this circumstance, rhetorical strategies advocating 
policy within a subcommittee have far-reaching influence, 
impacting the nature of debate on the floor of Congress, and, in 
turn, the tone of public debate throughout the nation. In many 
cases, the discursive tendencies of subcommittee debates eventually 
become “codified into law” (Gring-Pemble, 2001, p. 342). Relatedly, 
T. P. Hughes (1987) contends that “legislative artifacts, such as 
regulatory laws, can also be part of technological systems,” 
suggesting that the tone of debate in subcommittee hearings about 
technology influences how a technological system comes to operate 
(p. 51). If we accept that technological systems have political 
dimensions—a notion advanced by Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul, 
Herbert Marcuse, Langdon Winner, and others—then we must also 
accept that the success or failure of rhetorical strategies used within 
legislative artifacts connects directly with the quality and character 
of public life.  
Importantly, I am not here concerned with how the rhetoric of 
technology within legislative artifacts like NGC corresponds directly 
with the function and use of particular technologies. This 
conception of the rhetoric of technology, heavily influenced by 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) theorists and useful in 
its own right, tends to see rhetoric and technology locked in 
productive circulation where “there is dialectic between rhetoric 
and material design” (Bazerman, 1998, p. 385). Instead, I am 
interested in how a technology’s rhetorical depiction does not 
necessarily have to be truthful to or influential on that technology’s 
affordances—what it “offers” or “furnishes” its users (Gibson, 1977, 
p. 127). I envision this sort of rhetoric about technology as part of 
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what Arnold Pacey (1983) terms “technology-practice”—a collection 
of cultural, organizational, and technical practices that comprise a 
technology’s role in society (p. 6). Pacey draws a distinction 
between the technical, which he takes to be knowledge and skill 
that relate directly to tools and machines, and the technological, 
which he takes to be the technical so defined plus cultural and 
organizational beliefs and practices, the existence of which 
undergirds technology-practice (p. 7). This distinction draws 
attention to aspects of technology that are often overlooked, as well 
as provides a home for rhetoric within the technological milieu. 
While rhetorics about, within, and from technology are not 
necessarily technical, they are firmly technological. Miller (1998) 
contends that taking a “broad view of technology,” like that 
espoused by Pacey, grants “a better understanding of the rhetorical 
situations in which technological rhetoric occurs” and of “the 
rhetorical exigences that elicit it, the audiences and constraints that 
shape and potentiate it, as well as the rhetors and their motives that 
initiate it” (p. 289).  
As a component of technology-practice, rhetoric about technology 
must contend with a range of experiences and values that are often 
not compatible (Pacey, 1983, p. 122). These experiences and values 
circulate around technical objects, simultaneously promoting, 
destroying, or drawing attention to or from various nodes of 
meaning. Among these nodes of meaning are purely scientific and 
technical understandings of technology that possess the greatest 
comprehension of a technology’s full range of affordances. It 
follows, then, that select, non-technical beliefs about a technology’s 
affordances can be appropriated by those affordances to provide 
them a measure of ambiguity—eventually becoming incorporated in 
rhetoric about technology itself. From this view, NGC’s rhetoric 
about Big Data, when understood as part of Big Data technology-
practice, provides insight into how public rhetoric about Big Data 
can come to occlude Big Data’s technical aspects.  
As a part of technology-practice, I argue that rhetoric can alter 
public perception of what technics do and can occlude or 
misrepresent the other dimensions of technology-practice. 
Rhetoric, when understood as a part of technology-practice, must 
increase the urgency and attentiveness with which we observe 
legislative artifacts like NGC. If the lines of subcommittee debate 
can become “codified into law” and legislative artifacts themselves 
can be part of a technological system, then legislative actions can 
alter the public’s perception of a technology—potentially to the 
public’s detriment. In other words, rhetoric about technology can 
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become an extension of rhetoric from technology (Miller, 1998, p. 
307). In light of both this and the growing status of Big Data, NGC 
merits attention.           
Narrative Paradigms, Myth, and Technology 
Within a subcommittee meeting and other deliberative settings, 
then, by what means does rhetoric about technology resonate with 
rhetoric from technology? Within subcommittee debates, the use of 
narrative is the most pervasive rhetorical tool. About this, Lisa 
Gring-Pemble (2001) argues that once policy advocates grasp the 
political practices that envelop policy making, they “create 
compelling narratives and depictions that influence policy” (p. 361). 
The relationship between narrative and rhetoric was identified, for 
rhetorical studies at least, by Walter Fisher in 1984 when he argued 
that logic in rhetoric does not solely derive from a rational world 
paradigm, and instead proposed that a narrative paradigm is 
necessary to understand “life in all of its social dimensions” (p. 3). 
This realization brings with it a noteworthy epistemological 
implication. Within the rational world paradigm—a system typically 
seen as biased toward “subject matter knowledge” and 
“argumentative ability”—expertise and factual support of claims are 
the main source of rhetorical ethos, but within the narrative 
paradigm fidelity with already widely-accepted narrative structures 
takes on greater importance than strict logic. In short, a good story 
can trump both logic and expertise.  
When considering narratives about technology, it is important to 
note that the era of high technology—characterized by rapid 
development, intense spending, and complex technics— impacts 
what we perceive as sound ethos. Miller (1978) suggests that as 
technical systems become ensconced within society, growing rigid 
in their interactions with those who use them, it “becomes easier to 
conceptually change reality than it is to rebuild the technical 
system” and that “we abdicate our understanding of reality to the 
terms of the technical system” (p. 233). Carrying this forward, she 
supposes that by becoming a lens through which we understand the 
world, pervasive technics effectively force us to equate their modes 
of reasoning with human rhetoric, thus becoming a “form of 
consciousness” and diminishing our chances to construct genuine 
ethos (p. 236). Thus, from this point of view, practices like talking 
about the human brain as if it were a computer or understanding a 
landscape purely in terms of natural resources carry added ethical 
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force because they reflect the logic of the technical systems through 
which we have come to perceive reality.  
While I find Miller’s suggestion that life in a high technology 
society ransoms our narrative abilities to the logic of technical 
systems somewhat deterministic, I agree with her suggestion that 
the rhetoric resulting from technical systems becomes important to 
our ways of thinking. If we accept, as I argue, that rhetoric itself is 
part of technology-practice, then it is more likely that technology 
molds ethos in favor of its rhetorical justifications rather than the 
logic of its technical system. That is, we come to understand the 
technological world in the terms of stories used to justify 
technology instead of via the technics themselves. This reevaluation 
of technical logic places the rhetorical force of technology firmly 
within the province of narrativity without stripping away its impact 
on our reasoning. Felicitous ethos escapes the gravity of technical 
logic but still orbits closely around technology-practice. Capitalizing 
on a similar understanding, James Herrick (2017) writes that 
mythic narratives espoused by technofuturists 1) appeal to the 
public’s desire for order; 2) have corporate value and make possible 
cohesive social identities; 3) make transcendent visions about the 
future appear believable; 4) reveal their rhetorical force in their 
ability to bring transcendent visions to fruition; and 5) shape our 
rationality (pp. 21–22). By using beliefs expressed through myth 
and narrative as a strategy “deployed to envision for an audience a 
comprehensive order” (Herrick, 2017, p. 22), rhetorics of 
technology alter the public’s perception of ethical deliberation 
about technology-practice, making opaque the technical realities 
within that practice. Indeed, it is through myth and narrative that 
technology most impacts our view of the world. 
In subcommittee debates about technology policy, narrative logic 
is mobilized when issues of regulation, risk, funding, resource-
management, or development emerge. While many outcomes can 
result from subcommittee deliberation about technology policy, 
Patrick Hamlett (1983) argues that all outcomes contain two basic 
dimensions: policy discontinuity and technological integration (p. 
33). Policy discontinuity refers to “the degree of deviation from 
established practices and policies in the area under consideration” 
(Hamlett, 1983, p. 33). Decisions with high policy discontinuity 
deviate from what might be expected as a result of the past 
character of technology-practice. Thus, for example, if an 
administrative body in the U.S. adopts policy that encourages 
citizens to generate their own electricity and to remove themselves 
from the power grid, the recommendation would be highly 
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discontinuous with previous policy on the matter. Technological 
integration, on the other hand, “assesses the relative degree of 
concentration or decentralization in the network of social, 
economic, and political institutions and relationships surrounding a 
technology”—in other words, infrastructure (Hamlett, 1983, p. 34). 
Assessment of this dimension of technology policy determines how 
favorable a policy is to extant actors within technology-practice. 
Returning to the example about energy, we can note that a policy 
that places the onus of energy production on citizens might be 
viewed as having low integration depending on who precisely 
distributes the new machinery with which citizens create their 
energy. Typically, policies that are highly integrated and low in 
discontinuity are unpopular with the public as they drastically 
reduce the number of individuals who have input into technological 
development as well as encourage practices that benefit solely the 
established infrastructure (Hamlett, 1983, p. 39).  
Because narrative plays a significant role in the tone and outcome 
of subcommittee deliberations, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
rhetoric deployed in debates about technology policy impacts how 
discontinuous and integrated we perceive a new technology to be. 
Using rhetoric about technology to depict a new technic as 
innovative, for example, might draw attention away from how its 
technical dimensions are highly integrated and not discontinuous. 
Here, rhetoric about technology occludes the technical aspects of 
technology-practice by skirting discussion of them entirely. 
Typically, this is achieved by using narrative to forecast a technic’s 
possibilities or to award it a transformative depiction or function or 
effect —in either case, however, the rhetoric deters “our asking 
crucial questions” (Turkle, 2004, p. 21).  
In reference to the power of such depictions, David Nye (2004) 
provides a useful typology of public narratives about technology, 
sorting them into utopian and dystopian categories and drawing 
our attention to the wide range of narratives that circulate around 
technology-practice. On one hand, utopian narratives can be 1) 
natural, where technology is seen as naturally emerging from 
society, 2) ameliorative, where technology is seen as necessarily 
improving society, and 3) transformative, where technology 
reshapes society for the better. On the other hand, dystopian 
narratives can be seen as 1) hegemonic, where technology is used to 
gain power, 2) apocalyptic, where new technologies bring 
unwanted destruction to society, and 3) satiric, where new 
technologies affect society in unforeseen ways (p. 171). These 
narrative types are powerful tools for provoking action and 
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influencing attitudes within and about technology-practice, 
ensuring that the most favorable design does not always gain 
traction and that symbolic meaning obstructs sustained inquiry 
(Nye, 2004, pp. 161–170). As examples of rhetoric about 
technology, they characterize new technologies and policies about 
those technologies as either discontinuous and integrated or not. 
Ultimately, as a component of technology-practice, these narratives 
stand in the way of the public’s perception of rhetoric from 
technology by hearkening to the narrative ethos of a given 
technology and thus may perpetuate politics and power structures 
therein.     
When the merits of technological innovations are being debated, 
as during NGC, the use of or allusion to narratives linked to the 
justificatory rhetoric of a technology have dramatic effects on the 
results of deliberation. James Kauffmann (1994) provides a 
poignant example of this in his work about how the Kennedy 
administration justified the Apollo Program. He demonstrates that 
the Kennedy administration offered “political, scientific, military 
and economic justifications for sending a man to the moon” that 
were integrated into the frontier narrative (p. 5). Frontier rhetoric 
itself constitutes one of the nation’s “most enduring and 
characteristic” myths and plays heavily on conflict and harmony 
between individuals and communities (Hocker Rushing, 1983, p. 
15). Because this narrative is ingrained deeply within the American 
psyche, using it to justify the Apollo Program “produced a 
compelling case for funding manned space flight that could not 
easily be refuted by . . . a more ‘rationalistic’ worldview” (Kauffman, 
1994, p. 5). In this vein, John Jordan (2003) contends that 
Kennedy’s justification of the Apollo program used a transcendent 
rhetoric to draw the public’s attention away from “the technological 
complexity of the Apollo program” and toward the public’s 
narrative role in the adventure, influencing both how the public 
behaved and their interactions with technology-practices related to 
the Apollo program (p. 226). The use of frontier rhetoric not only 
fashioned a program that was, at times, widely popular, but also 
helped to dismiss criticism by placing detractors in a position of 
opposition to a culturally significant belief. In due course, the result 
of this narrative’s use were subcommittee debates that 
“superficially . . . engaged in thorough investigation of the Kennedy 
administration’s space proposals” without seriously questioning 
their need (Kauffman, 1994, p. 94). Situating the new technology 
within a well-trod, transformative, and utopian narrative afforded 
the program’s apologists the ability to draw attention away from 
how integrated into the industrial complex the program was and to 
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convince the public that the program was radically discontinuous 
with the industrial complex and thus worthy of support.  
Kennedy’s frontier rhetoric demonstrates how narratives and 
myths about technology often make use of stories and beliefs that 
are already embedded into American life. Many “adapt themes that 
have been in place for more than a century” (Herrick, 2017, p. 25). 
The use of extant narratives can lubricate the public’s acceptance or 
rejection of a technology by situating it within a narrative paradigm 
that is already pervasive. For example, in the early twentieth 
century, Theodore Roosevelt earned Congress’s approval to 
construct the Great White Fleet by situating the fleet within the 
myth of a “wonderous now” that catered to the public’s perception 
of the United States as a “technologically advanced peace keeping 
force” (Dorsey, 1997, p. 450). Situating the Great White Fleet within 
this already developed narrative cultivated beliefs about the ships 
not as warships or tools of empire, but instead as manifestations of 
peace. This characterization enabled Americans to overlook the 
apocalyptic rhetoric from the ships’ technical design as tools of 
destruction in favor of the ameliorative rhetoric about them.  
Here, we must note that the use of narrative myth by proponents 
of a technology is not a carte blanche to claim anything about that 
technology. Authoritative claims about a technology are necessarily 
constrained by its material components and claims of what a 
technology can do cannot drastically exceed what the public might 
reasonably expect. This is a poignant observation when considering 
technologies that already exist or those that are being developed 
from extant technologies, as the public already has a familiarity 
with the technology-practice with which proponents must reckon. 
“Looming over any technological spectacle,” Charles Griffin (2013) 
writes, “is the possibility that a targeted public will draw the wrong 
lessons from it . . . The audience may construe the material and 
symbolic elements of the operation as incompatible, or they may 
pay too much attention to one at the expense of the other” (p. 522). 
Griffin’s observation is important when considered in light of Big 
Data technologies. At the time of NGC, these were relatively new, 
meaning that members of the subcommittee would have had little 
to no direct experience with them. This problem is amplified by the 
nature of Big Data itself, which is fundamentally a “hermeneutic 
technology”—one through which we come to interpret reality (Ihde, 
1990, pp. 80–86). Because Big Data infrastructure usually is not 
physically interacted with and its output is accepted as ontologically 
valid (or, perhaps, even as being ontological in itself), Big Data 
technologies are easily attached to myth and narrative as they can 
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be construed as providing the justification for the existence of a 
myth to begin with. In other words, when we allow ourselves to 
view Big Data as fully representative of the world, it is easily used to 
justify myth the long predates it. 
The American Middle-Landscape 
In the U.S., perhaps the most invoked narratives about technology 
relate to what is known as the middle-landscape. Articulated by Leo 
Marx (1964), the myth of the middle-landscape portrays the U.S. as 
a place where the excesses of industrialism are balanced with the 
redeeming power of nature (pp. 5, 32, 114–115). In its simplest form 
it is “a new, distinctively American, post-Romantic, industrial 
version of the pastoral design” (Marx, 1964, p. 32).  
Despite its name, the middle-landscape is less a physical location 
than a system of beliefs expressed throughout American history in 
popular stories, national myths, economic policy, material design, 
and a variety of other contexts. The origins of this myth trace back 
to the colonial era and interweave with the earliest manifestations 
of industry, demonstrating optimism about Americans’ “ability to 
stem the industrial and technological tide” without abandoning it 
(Rowe, 1991, p. 236). Unlike in Europe, whose industrial adventure 
impacted the population in pronounced and ill-begotten ways, 
industry in early North America was sparse and spread out. 
Because industries tended to be far-flung, their impact on what was 
perceived by European colonists as a pristine environment was 
limited. The material aspects of industry comingled with a 
cultivated, pastoral landscape without seeming out of place. The 
term “middle-landscape” itself refers both to the early American 
proclivity to live a lifestyle that was not too industrial and not too 
rural, as well as the location of the early U.S. on the map—situated 
between industrialized Europe and the “unsettled” American west 
(Marx, 1964, p. 125).     
The classic image of the middle-landscape used by Marx and 
others is George Inness’s 1856 painting titled The Lackawanna 
Valley. A detour to consider this image will be fruitful for my 
analysis of middle-landscape narratives at NGC. In Inness’s 
painting, a steam locomotive moves gracefully through the pastoral 
countryside and steadily away from a town. The countryside is 
cultivated—stumps of trees are visible—yet still recognizably close 
to the wilderness. Both the locomotive and the town are nestled 
into the scene in a manner that allows them to fade into it. The  
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steam from the locomotive and smoke from the town effortlessly 
blend with the early morning haze, and the town itself appears to 
grow from the forest. There is little to indicate that industry 
intrudes upon the landscape—in fact, it may even be interpreted as 
improving it aesthetically, as the scene itself is entirely pleasant 
(Marx, 1964, p. 221). As a visual rhetoric about technology, The 
Lackawanna Valley does little to distinguish industry from 
cultivated nature.  
 
 
The middle-landscape and its depiction in The Lackawanna 
Valley and other similar media highlights a peculiar relationship 
between technology and nature in the U.S. At least up until the 
contemporary environmental movement, popular discourses have 
often depicted technology and nature as not necessarily opposed to 
one another (Nye, 1994, p. 23). Instead, tension is typically located 
between the pastoral ideal and industrialization—between the right 
amount of industry and too much industry. Technology, especially 
industrial technology, is generally viewed as improving nature by 
bringing wasted resources into fruitful production. While middle-
landscape narratives view an overabundance of industry as 
detrimental, little about industrial technology in itself is 
questioned. On the other hand, nature is believed to temper the 
centralizing tendencies of industry. Overexposure to nature, 
however, turns citizens into “savages” who live in the wilderness too 
far away to be rescued by either civilization or technology. In short, 
the middle-landscape, and the industry therein, is accepted either 
George Inness, The Lackawanna Valley. Courtesy of the National 
Gallery of Art. 
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explicitly or implicitly as a moralizing milieu within which civilizing 
technology produces good citizens.  
In the U.S., an underlying acceptance of beliefs associated with 
the middle-landscape has been immensely influential during the 
past 200 years. Belief in it and in narratives descended from it have 
been components of a variety of technology-practices and 
instrumental to the acceptance of the idea of technological 
progress. As a rhetoric about technology, it has made opaque 
rhetorics from many different technologies, becoming an integral 
factor in the growth of industrial capitalism. Importantly, the power 
of beliefs related to the middle-landscape persists in the U.S. even 
as pastoral environments evaporate and modern, suburban 
environments grow. In this vein, Torben Huus Larsen (2010) 
contends that “the middle landscape narrative allowed the pastoral 
ideal to survive the industrial revolution, albeit in a modern 
version,” and that, “by the twentieth century the pastoral ideal still 
permeated American society” despite the fact that most Americans 
now reside in urban areas (p. 14). The versatility of the middle-
landscape is a function of its core concern with finding balance 
between two extremes—a characteristic that enables it to be 
rhetorically “indeterminate” and “to form where needed” 
(Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 34). For Larsen, the middle-landscape lives 
on most strongly in simulations and reproductions of pastoral 
settings in decidedly non-pastoral locations, such as museums and 
other tourist attractions. Other locations that embody the middle-
landscape ideal in the modern U.S. are designed to do so, 
demonstrating the enduring power of the myth and the core beliefs 
it articulates even today. As Peter Rowe (1991) argues, in the U.S. 
“the modern technical temperament with its technological 
optimism . . . is engaged with complementary attitudes of 
individual self-reliance, traditional small-town values, and dwelling 
close to nature,” resulting in the persistence of a mindset that still 
desires for emerging technologies to be tempered by nature (p. 
290). 
Because of the middle-landscape’s versatility and its resonance 
with situations with which it is not commonly associated, implicit 
belief in the myth’s basic premises remains strong even today, even 
when it is not explicitly invoked. Myth and narrative need not be 
imported wholesale to retain their power, and portions of 
narratives or the rhetorical devices that they make use of are often 
enough to evoke the full force of a narrative paradigm (Herrick, 
2017, p. 25). Today, premises predicated on the middle-landscape 
bubble up in a variety of rhetoric. For example, the belief that 
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technology makes us better citizens is alive and well in dialogues 
about social media and educational technologies. Natural resources 
are still considered to be wasted if not brought into production—
industrial or otherwise. People leave dense cities and rural 
countryside for the suburbs or some other mix of development and 
wilderness. The assumptions of the middle-landscape have become 
so embedded in American culture that it no longer requires pastoral 
imagery to bring them to mind. Yet, piece together the allusions 
found in the justification of new technologies and one inevitably 
finds a metaphorical modern-day pasture with industry safely in 
the distance—as Howard Segal (1977) argues, middle-landscape 
allusions have become “a cheap rhetorical device masking a very 
different reality” (p. 139).    
While policy discourses about Big Data might appear to be 
unsuitable places to find allusions to the middle-landscape, one of 
my main contentions in the remainder this essay will be that much 
of the rhetoric about Big Data descends from early American 
industrial rhetorics. Marx himself argues that the middle-landscape 
“was continually redefined to meet new circumstances” (Segal, 
1977, p. 140). In this spirit, I argue that the middle-landscape lurks 
within the justificatory rhetoric of Big Data, allowing what is 
ostensibly a new and innovative technology to draw from older 
rhetorical traditions that continue to permeate modern industries. 
Perhaps the most powerful example of the persistence of the 
middle landscape is an image produced by Eric Goldstein as an 
advertisement for GE—part of “A trade campaign . . . showcasing 
the industrial internet and the potential for data to create huge 
efficiencies” (Goldstein, 2018). Captioned with the text “A 
locomotive so advanced, it’s got data coming out of the caboose” 
(Goldstein, 2018), this image depicts a modern locomotive built of 
analytic technologies pulling boxcars made of data. In the 
background, the source of this data—mountains that are 
Eric Goldstein, Untitled, Retrieved from GE.com/digital. 
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represented by the peaks and troughs of line graphs—stands tall 
and awaits to be processed. Intentionally or not, this image clearly 
echoes Inness’s The Lackawanna Valley, demonstrating the 
enduring influence of the middle-landscape even in digital and 
highly mediated contexts. In the following section, I show that this 
metaphorical, digital middle-landscape is at the heart of NGC. In 
this capacity, middle-landscape allusions are an aspect of the 
technology-practice of Big Data. They situate data, which is an 
ethereal and nebulous object, within a tangible and easily 
understandable narrative. These allusions are vital to how the 
policy discontinuity and technological integration of Big Data are 
perceived both by lawmakers and the public. Not only do they help 
shroud rhetoric from Big Data in a moralizing and utopian aura, 
they also provide a conceptual framework through which Big Data 
is understood—a reality that ultimately conditions how we believe it 
should be used.  
Middle-Landscape Allusions at “Next Generation 
Computing and Big Data Analytics” 
The rhetoric used by expert witnesses at NGC is an example of how 
the middle-landscape myth pervades policy deliberation about Big 
Data as rhetoric about technology. Because NGC occurred at a 
confluence of events vital to the growth of Big Data in the U.S. and 
took place within a subcommittee, it showcases justificatory 
rhetoric commonly used to advocate for Big Data and highlights 
how this rhetoric becomes interwoven with the act of legislation. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates how rhetoric from technology, in 
the form of its technical affordances, can appropriate rhetoric about 
technology. About this, I argue that as rhetoric about Big Data, 
allusions to the middle-landscape that lurk within the expert 
witnesses’ justificatory rhetoric demonstrate how rhetoric from Big 
Data adapts cultural myths and beliefs to itself in a manner that 
camouflages it as a wholly acceptable technology and, ultimately, 
stymies sustained critique.  
To adequately determine the worth of Big Data and represent a 
spectrum of funding priorities, the subcommittee at NGC heard 
testimony from representatives of industry, academia, and 
government. Three expert witnesses were summoned. The first to 
testify was Dr. David McQueeny, vice president of technical strategy 
and worldwide operations at IBM Research. As the witness 
representing industry, McQueeny brought years of experience at 
IBM to the panel. McQueeny was “responsible for setting the 
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direction of IBM’s overall Research Strategy across twelve 
worldwide labs and leading the global operations and information 
systems teams” (NGC, 2013, p. 25), meaning that he had direct 
involvement with the research agenda of one of the largest 
technology firms that work with Big Data. Because of his position, 
McQueeny was knowledgeable about industrial investment 
priorities regarding Big Data. Representing academia was Dr. 
Michael Rappa, executive director of the Institute for Advanced 
Analytics at North Carolina State University. As founder of the 
nation’s “preeminent Master of Science in Analytics” program and a 
participant in a variety of academic research initiatives oriented 
toward Big Data, Rappa possessed an intimate understanding of 
academic funding priorities. Dr. Farnam Jahanian, assistant 
director for the Computer and Information Science and 
Engineering Directorate at the National Science Foundation, was 
selected to speak on behalf of government. Because of his role at the 
NSF “to uphold the Nation’s leadership in computer and 
information science and engineering through its support for 
foundational and transformative advances that are key drivers of 
economic competitiveness and critical in achieving our national 
priorities,” Jahanian was uniquely able to testify on behalf of the 
funding priorities of government institutions (NGC, 2013, p. 53). 
Together, McQueeny, Rappa, and Jahanian paint a picture of the 
state of Big Data in 2013, giving special attention to developmental 
needs and how federal funding might address those needs. While 
each witness tailors his testimony to his background and expertise, 
several interlocking themes emerge from their collective testimony. 
Together, these themes constitute a justificatory rhetoric that 
characterizes and forecasts Big Data in a manner that allows the 
witnesses to guide deliberation and stymie criticism. I argue that 
these themes are descendants of the middle-landscape myth and as 
such impact NGC by disrupting the committee’s ability to 
adequately inquire into the worth of Big Data. 
Big Data Technologies Improve the Nation  
This theme manifests itself in the rhetoric of the three expert 
witnesses and in the lines of questioning used by the subcommittee. 
Its pervasiveness throughout NGC strongly suggests its presence in 
most discourses about Big Data at the time. Thus, by tapping into 
what was likely a common belief among the subcommittee, the 
witnesses attempt to cultivate a collective telos—in this case the 
goal is to grow Big Data and expand its beneficial side-effects—and 
direct deliberation toward how that telos will be achieved. Through 
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doing so, this theme demonstrates how rhetoric from Big Data, in 
the form of its affordances, is fit into a mythic rhetoric about Big 
Data that depicts it as necessarily benefiting the public. In this case, 
the ability of Big Data to synthesize large amounts of data into 
actionable information is described in a manner that resonates with 
assumptions about technology associated with the middle-
landscape, drawing attention toward its mythic potential and away 
from its affordances that clash with those assumptions.  
 The witnesses use sweeping generalizations and specific examples 
to contend that Big Data improves the nation. Typical of the 
sweeping generalizations is Rappa’s statement during his oral 
testimony that “advances in computer technology and powerful 
analytic tools make it possible to . . . draw insights from data to 
solve pressing problems from increasing operational efficiency to 
combating fraud, to better health care, to protecting national 
security” (NGC, 2013, p. 26). Here, Rappa characterizes Big Data as 
a panacea to problems likely deemed relevant by the subcommittee. 
Sweeping generalizations like this are supported by nuanced 
demonstrations of Big Data’s potential. For example, McQueeny’s 
reference to data analytics being used by the Memphis Police 
Department to “find patterns that police could not see themselves” 
(p. 19) and Jahanian’s reference to the use of Big Data technology 
by physicians to improve cancer patients’ “survival times” (p. 41) 
both support the point. Together, the sweeping generalizations and 
specific examples used by witnesses paint a picture of Big Data as 
necessary to the future well-being of the nation. Driving this idea 
home, Jahanian contends that the Big Data industry provides an 
“enormous opportunity to position the nation at the forefront of 
advances in science and engineering, job creation, and economic 
development” (p. 52).  
 Broad claims that new and developing technologies benefit 
citizens are a core tenet of middle-landscape beliefs, which 
highlight how technology becomes a moralizing force when 
appropriately deployed. This aspect of middle-landscape belief 
originates in 19th-century American attempts to fuse pastoralism 
with the growth of widespread industrialism (Segal, 1977, p. 138). 
Then, the American propensity to value pastoral landscapes for 
their moral value was threatened by the intrusion of industrial 
technologies into those landscapes—a reality that was solved by the 
conceptual fusion of industry and pasture. A conflation of well-kept 
gardens with well-kept machines—apparent in Inness’s The 
Lackawanna Valley—developed into a belief that well-kept 
machines and other technologies impart pastoral-like civil benefits 
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to those who live amongst them. While Big Data and other network-
based technologies are typically not physically situated within a 
pastoral setting, the allusive power of this imagery is apparent in 
metaphors like the “walled-garden” that have been used to describe 
the early internet. Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas (2004) 
argue that “the transformative power awarded to new technologies 
is directly related to the idea that technologies arise not of the world 
in which we live but as a force that comes magically from elsewhere, 
a force seemingly outside of social and political influences” (p. 4). 
In this case, allusions to well-kept Big Data technologies 
transforming the nation for the better derive their power from the 
middle-landscape tradition and a type of nostalgia for the past 
(Rowe, 1991, p. 236).  
 Furthermore, beliefs advocated at NGC that Big Data is a means 
to improve the nation result in the characterization of Big Data as 
worthy of national pride. It is a practice that also derives from the 
middle-landscape myth. Because the notion of a middle-landscape 
developed in a uniquely American context—both geographically 
and ideologically—there developed over time a belief in the U.S. 
that American society is particularly suited to reap the benefits of 
industrial technology (Nye, 1994, pp. 17–43). At NGC, the 
descendants of this belief are best demonstrated in repeated 
referencing of competition between nations to create cutting-edge 
Big Data infrastructure. McQueeny demonstrates this best. When 
asked by Representative Randy Hultgren about the status of U.S. 
computer infrastructure in relation to the rest of the world, 
McQueeny states that while the U.S. is still in a leadership position, 
“other countries have noticed the success that we have had in . . . 
leading the way on high performance computing breakthroughs” 
(NGC, 2013, p. 64) and begun their own programs to challenge the 
U.S. This statement echoes sentiments in his written testimony, 
where McQueeny contends that when it comes to Big Data, “The 
U.S. is still ahead but others are catching up fast . . . in sum, the 
race is on” (NGC, 2013, p. 19). By framing the development of Big 
Data infrastructure as a race, McQueeny not only hearkens to the 
competitive aspects of industrial capitalism, but also suggests that 
winning this race will result in the U.S. winning a greater share of 
the prize—the ability to improve itself in ways that other nations 
cannot achieve. Ultimately, leading the world in the development of 
cutting-edge technologies self-affirms the deep-seated belief that 
American culture is better suited than others for actualizing the 
utopian potentials of developing technologies.   
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Big Data is a Resource 
Describing Big Data as a resource is closely related to the belief that 
Big Data will improve the nation. If the prior theme makes claims 
about the potential of Big Data in the abstract, then the present 
theme provides substance to those claims by metaphorically 
characterizing Big Data as a physical commodity that enables 
change when it is brought into production. Metaphors related to 
this belief locate Big Data upon an imagined landscape—in this 
case, cyberspace—within which it is a natural resource to be both 
exploited and protected. Through using this type of rhetoric about 
Big Data to describe Big Data technology’s technical ability to 
gather large quantities of information, NGC’s expert witnesses 
again cloak rhetoric from Big Data in beliefs that paint it as a 
benign tool that produces beneficial products. 
Emphasizing the bountiful quantity and potential of the data 
resource, McQueeny states that “There exists today an 
overabundance of data” and that “leveraging the capabilities 
presented by this will be a key factor in determining which 
countries pull ahead economically and which fall behind” (NGC, 
2013, p. 24). Echoing this sentiment and suggesting that abundant 
data is a type of natural resource that can be brought into 
production, Jahanian argues that the nation’s ability to “store, 
integrate, and extract meaning . . . from data” (NGC, 2013, p. 41) is 
vital to the future of the U.S. During questioning by the 
subcommittee, McQueeny further draws parallels between data and 
natural resources by suggesting that data collection technologies 
like LIDAR might create data sets out stands of trees that then can 
be used to guide the sustainable exploitation of timber—a situation 
that would see Big Data as a resource in a twofold sense (NGC, 
2013, p. 59). The perception at NGC of Big Data as a resource is 
further supported by rhetoric that explains how data is made 
useful. For example, when Representative Ami Bera asked the 
witnesses how data quality is ensured, Rappa responded: “I think 
most data starts off as bad data” and that “cleaning and cultivating 
that data makes its useful” (NGC, 2013, p. 62). Here, we see an 
understanding that data, like any natural resource, must be 
processed and turned into a product before it is useful. Similarly, 
McQueeny, when describing how Big Data works, states that 
analytic tools are “applied to unstructured data from the web” and 
“transform latent data into meaningful, actionable information,” 
thus emphasizing the need to transform data from its natural state 
into something new and useful (NGC, 2013, p. 18). 
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The belief that data is an abundant resource manifests during 
NGC in metaphors that characterize data as a commodity that can 
and should be brought into productive use. The use of such 
metaphors to describe Big Data has been widely noted and the 
types of metaphors used by witnesses at NGC are generally 
symmetrical with those used by others. Cornelius Puschmann and 
Jean Burgess (2004) organize common metaphors about Big Data 
into two broad categories: “Big Data is a force of nature to be 
controlled” and “Big Data is nourishment/fuel to be consumed” 
(pp. 1698–1701). Importantly, categories such as these—which are 
derived from common trends in public discourse about Big Data—
point to a pervasive understanding of data as a resource that exists 
within American society and suggest that the expert witnesses’ 
rhetoric was influenced by previous exposure to such ways of 
thinking. These metaphor types are perhaps best summed up by a 
common retort during the early 2010s that “Big Data is the new 
oil”—a saying that alludes to data as a resource and as a potential 
source of prosperity (Rotella, 2012).  
The present theme’s connection with the middle-landscape myth 
is apparent when we consider the relationship between wilderness 
and the industrialized pasture therein. As an unproductive and 
untamed area, wilderness within middle landscape narratives is 
typically perceived as dangerous waste. Those who dwell in its 
midst are characterized as “savage” and “uncivilized” for their 
inability to call forth the productive potentials latent in their 
homeland. This attitude is apparent in early American writings 
influenced by middle-landscape beliefs. For example, in the 1785 
pamphlet by Celadon titled The Golden Age; or, Future Glory of 
North-America Discovered by an Angel to Celadon in Several 
Entertaining Visions, when describing the western regions of North 
America, an angel who identifies itself as the guardian of America 
says: 
This western part of America is yet but an uncultivated 
desart (sic); the haunt of savages (sic); the range of wild 
beasts—but soil in general is much richer than that of the 
eastern division . . . do you see yonder long valley.—How 
full of the choicest timber! What fine springs it contains! 
And how many perennial rivers glide through it, at 
suitable distances! (pp. 11–12)  
Here, wilderness is characterized as an untapped resource—
whether that resource is timber, soil, or navigable waterways—
whose conversion to a productive capacity will benefit the nation. 
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Similarly, the characterization of Big Data as a resource 
metaphorically places it upon an imagined landscape of cyberspace. 
To extract, mine, process, or bring into useful production data that 
is going to waste is to, as Jahanian puts it, “transform all aspects of 
our lives” (NGC, 2013, p. 39).  
 Characterizing Big Data as a resource that must be brought into 
production necessarily raises issues of privacy, as the data sets that 
Big Data processes are usually composed of personal information 
and traces of the activities of individuals. While the origin of the 
word data—it is typically defined as the understanding of 
something given, like a fact or piece of information—does not 
suggest a sole focus on personal information, the contemporary 
propensity to use large quantities of data from the internet, coupled 
with “a shift toward even greater computability and 
commercialization” (Puschmann & Burgess, 2014, p. 1694) in the 
Big Data industry, encourages the commodification and trade of 
data previously considered private. Because of this trend, emerging 
Big Data technologies are often embroiled in controversy about 
protocols for using the “resource” that is private information. NGC 
is no exception. For example, Rappa defends the use of personal 
information by reminding the subcommittee that a government 
confidentiality agreement binds organizations to protect the data 
that they use, thus suggesting that the government does in fact 
exercise oversight on the matter (NGC, 2013, pp. 59–60). Jahanian 
suggests that privacy can be built into data analytic systems, thus 
ensuring that not all data is exploited by virtue of the technology of 
exploitation itself. While addressing the privacy issue, McQueeny 
writes that “organizational processes and technology can protect 
privacy” and that by doing so “organizations using personal 
information . . . become better stewards of information and help 
individuals make more informed choices” (NGC, 2013, p. 20). 
McQueeny’s use of the word “stewardship” mirrors later language 
in the hearing where he uses the same word to refer to how Big 
Data will “cultivate valuable natural resources that need 
tremendous amounts of stewardship” (NGC, 2013, p. 59). This 
diction is common to environmental discourses, and its use here 
suggests that data is a resource that can be overexploited at 
detriment to the nation.  
Like rhetoric that characterizes data as a resource, rhetoric that 
calls for the stewardship of data links to the middle-landscape 
myth. The easiest way to envision how is to return to Inness’s The 
Lackawanna Valley. Here, we must pay close attention to the 
balance between forest and cleared land. While it is obvious that 
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timber is exploited as a resource to better the settlement in the 
distance—smoke from the locomotive and various other industrial 
sites attests to this—a pastoral balance is yet apparent between 
industry and the remaining stands of trees. It is this balance 
between cultivated nature and industry that grants the scene its 
serene and civilizing force—no sharp distinction exists between “the 
man-made and the natural terrain” (Marx, 1964, p. 221). Virtue 
exists in understanding the stewardship required to balance the 
two. In the imagined cyberspace of the digital middle-landscape, 
timber is replaced by data. Overexploitation of the data resource 
destroys its utopian potential and grants force to rhetoric that 
defends its stewardship. By associating with rhetoric that praises 
stewardship, Big Data’s technical affordance of mass data 
exploitation effectively becomes an afterthought.  
The Current Workforce is Inadequate for the Needs of the 
Big Data Industry  
In all cases, the expert witnesses display noticeable concern for 
workforce development, calling attention to rhetoric from Big 
Data’s need to cultivate a scene within which large numbers of 
individuals think in the terms of its own logic. Importantly, this 
theme shows how Big Data’s technical need for a workforce able to 
understand and make use of its output can be woven into beliefs 
that depict self-reliance as a virtue. As such, this is the most 
common theme throughout NGC. McQueeny’s contentions in his 
written testimony that an unskilled workforce is “a major inhibitor 
to the growth of next generation computing and Big Data” and that 
“Big Data requires new skills, knowledge and new types of decision 
making” are representative of this theme (NGC, 2013, p. 20). In 
fact, read without context, the transcript of the hearing might be 
interpreted as a record of deliberation about workforce training for 
Big Data rather than about funding priorities in general. However, 
according to NGC’s hearing charter—the document that outlines the 
parameters of the hearing—the subcommittee requests that 
witnesses “describe private and public Big Data research and 
development efforts, applications of Big Data initiatives; and 
management challenges, including workforce development issues” 
so that they might deliberate over issues of departmental 
coordination, privacy, and prioritization of funding (NGC, 2013, p. 
7). Juxtaposed with the original call, the witnesses’ proclivity to 
focus on workforce development is curious. 
 The witnesses’ emphasis on workforce development emerges in 
two ways. Discussion of workforce development in relation to 
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education is most common. For example, Rappa—the expert 
witness who represents academia—argues that the biggest 
challenge currently facing the nation is “our ability to educate a 
data savvy workforce that has the analytical skills to put data into 
action” (NGC, 2013, p. 26). Similarly, McQueeny contends that 
“collaborations between IBM and top U.S. universities are building 
a workforce of professionals and are creating new jobs” for “data-
hungry employers,” referring to a newly founded MS in Business 
Analytics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute as evidence of IBM’s 
own attempts to develop the workforce (NGC, 2013, p. 21). This 
theme also emerges in examples given to justify how Big Data 
improves the nation. For example, Jahanian gives an account of 
how workers trained in data analytics “pioneered an intelligent 
thermostat that uses machine learning to transform home heating 
and cooling . . . using algorithms . . . for lower energy use” (NGC, 
2013, p. 40). According to the narrative crafted by the witnesses, 
this type of technological advance is only possible if a workforce 
knowledgeable about Big Data is readily available.  
 Where the prior two themes (“Big Data is a Resource” and “Big 
Data Technologies Improve the Nation”) are comprised of rhetoric 
that metaphorically alludes to, characterizes, and potentiates the 
nature of Big Data as a descendent of the middle-landscape myth, 
talk about workforce needs in relation to Big Data carves out a place 
for citizens in relation to that myth. As Herrick (2017) notes, myths 
about technology appeal to the public’s presumed desire for order 
and make possible cohesive social identities in relation to 
technology. He argues that the work these myths do when “defining 
what belongs and what is excluded” conveys values, creates 
enemies, and “reflects rhetorical intent” (p. 21). In early middle-
landscape narratives, the apparent success of industrial cities like 
Humphreysville, Waltham, Lawrence, and Lowell was referenced 
by proponents of industry to encourage the public to adopt skillsets 
that would position them to be successful in a middle-landscape, 
with those who resisted labeled as Luddites or worse (Segal, 1977, 
p. 139). Those equipped for life in the middle-landscape were 
simultaneously depicted as self-reliant individuals and as people 
granted “personal fulfillment” from industrial “co-operative 
identity” (Machor, 1987, p. 13). A confluence of individualism and 
collectivism was a hallmark of American pastoralism—especially 
within the middle-landscape myth—and allowed it to become a 
“cornerstone of intellectual and artistic experience” especially 
regarding “appropriate grounds for human settlement” or activity 
(Rowe, 1991, p. 226). This confluence made possible the melding of 
individualism with the necessarily collective nature of industry, a 
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reality that lubricated the introduction of industry into American 
life.  
Echoing the history of industrial discourse in the United States, 
allusions to the middle-landscape myth at NGC constitute a 
rhetoric that divides people who can work with Big Data from 
people who cannot, positioning those who can with future 
prosperity and those who cannot with failure. For example, Rappa 
contends that students trained in data analytics are better suited for 
the workforce than students who are not because they are people 
“who work well in teams, can communicate . . . insights to decision 
makers, who can actually use the tools and apply the knowledge in 
an organizational context,” and who possess the technical insight 
necessary to bring about lasting change (NGC, 2013, p. 57). 
Building on this notion, Rappa and McQueeny both suggest that 
privacy concerns are easily mitigated when “conscious,” “clear-
eyed,” and “respectful” data analytic professionals are in charge of 
processing Big Data (NGC, 2013, p. 60). Just as with the industrial 
technologies that this rhetoric about Big Data echoes, it is the 
workers who are trained to properly use Big Data who are 
rhetorically granted success and are best able to reap data’s bounty. 
By appealing for worker training, the witnesses essentially call for 
worthy volunteers to pioneer a digital version of The Lackawanna 
Valley—a space that is brought into existence using allusions to the 
middle-landscape myth. These volunteers must be self-reliant—a 
characteristic they express through the burden of self-funded 
education that requires students to make choices “based upon 
future employment predictions in the new economy” (Lakes, 2008, 
p. 343). In demonstrating their proclivity to be individually 
motivated, they are granted the benefits of Big Data technologies 
that inherently rely on the existence of a collective. 
Big Data, Rhetoric, and Foreclosing Deliberation 
about Technology Policy—A Conclusion 
Deliberately or not, the expert witnesses’ rhetoric that comprises 
the three themes I detail above echoes the middle-landscape myth 
and positions Big Data within a similar, but imagined, digital 
middle-landscape. Doing so allows rhetoric about Big Data to 
resonate with and veil rhetoric from Big Data by impeding 
forthright deliberation about the rote, technical aspects of Big Data 
technology. The witnesses draw upon the American middle-
landscape myth by using a mishmash of natural, utopian, 
ameliorative, and transformative narratives to deflect critical 
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inquiry into the technical reality and social implications of Big 
Data. Instead of engaging in critical inquiry, NGC presupposes Big 
Data’s acceptability and concentrates attention upon its potential. 
The success of the more visible, narrative portions of Big Data’s 
technology-practice—evidenced by a dramatic increase in funding 
after NGC—allows its technical dimensions to become further 
entangled with public life while remaining essentially unnoticed.  
 The success of middle-landscape allusions at NGC resides in how 
these allusions allow the witnesses to turn the hearing’s lines of 
questioning upon the subcommittee without appearing to break 
with the spirit of the occasion. The witnesses flip the script 
primarily through the ubiquitous third theme: the inadequate 
workforce. While it is only a small portion of what they were 
requested to testify on, the witnesses use deliberation about 
workforce development as a pivot upon which to address a variety 
of issues, including the past successes, research, privacy, and future 
possibilities of Big Data. Whether intentional or not, approaching 
NGC in this manner inhibited its potential as a general inquiry into 
the value of Big Data and reframed NGC as an inquiry into how the 
subcommittee might help to better facilitate the development of 
what is characterized as a necessary technology.  
How this shift of focus functions is most evident in the way the 
subcommittee questions the witnesses. During the first round of 
questioning, members of Congress repeatedly ask how federal 
funding might improve the Big Data workforce, with questions 
explicitly inquiring into education at community colleges, getting 
children interested in data analysis, retraining workers with 
obsolete skillsets, and the pedagogical practices that best facilitate 
teaching about Big Data. The flipped script is especially palpable in 
the following question raised by Representative Dan Lipinski: “How 
can the federal government most effectively partner with industry 
to achieve common goals and do you believe that industry has 
sufficient input into the Federal Government’s research agenda as it 
relates to Big Data?” (NGC, 2013, p. 66). Questions like this became 
felicitous as a result of how alluding to the middle-landscape myth 
characterizes data as a necessary resource and places the future 
prosperity and moral worth of the nation in the hands of the 
subcommittee. By invoking the middle-landscape tropology, the 
witnesses encourage the subcommittee to advocate for “wise” labor 
practices lest they be perceived as stunting the growth of the nation. 
Creating a sense that either the public or government must support 
industry to safeguard their own future has been termed “industrial 
apocalyptic rhetoric” and often allows those who do not fit into its 
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narrative to be scapegoated—especially when that narrative invokes 
deeply embedded cultural beliefs (Peeples et al., 2014, p. 245). 
Lipinski’s question, which comes after several inquiries into how 
the Big Data workforce might be grown, demonstrates the 
subcommittees’ reactive, rather than proactive, response to the 
witnesses’ testimony and shows their desire to not be listed among 
those who reject the Big Data myth. In other words, they respond in 
the terms proposed by the witnesses. As such, government 
contribution—or lack thereof—to pioneering Big Data’s imagined 
middle-landscape becomes the focus of critical inquiry rather than 
the Big Data industry itself.  
In their capacity as rhetoric about technology, allusions to the 
middle-landscape at NGC raise troubling questions about our 
ability to deliberate collectively over the technical dimension of Big 
Data technology-practice (that is, rhetoric from Big Data). Because 
the middle-landscape myth expresses the tension between industry 
and nature within American culture (Pacey, 1983, pp. 121–123), its 
invocation signals a situation within which dialectic between these 
two forces occurs. The middle-landscape’s appearance within a 
congressional hearing about technology policy is unsurprising and 
suggests a need to critically deliberate over the technology at hand 
lest that landscape become dominated by some manifestation of 
industry. As the landscape of cyberspace is metaphorical, the 
dialectic that often occurs is between personal data—which is 
represented by nature—and the right to exploit it. Upon the 
landscape of cyberspace, humans themselves become Heidegger’s 
(1977) “standing reserve” (p. 17)—ready to be exploited so that they 
can ostensibly better themselves with the products of that 
exploitation. Pacey (1983) argues that what matters most in 
situations where such dialectic occurs is not “which values come out 
on top, but how conflicts are handled” (p. 122). That is, because this 
type of policy debate has potential to drastically affect the character 
and quality of life, it is necessary to work through the issues it raises 
from as many angles as possible. Richard Sclove (1995) terms this 
ideal a strong democratic approach to innovation—a type of 
deliberation neatly summed up by the retort: “No innovation 
without representation”—and argues that all technology 
policymaking should “seek democratic procedures for formulating 
and applying rationally contestable design criteria” (p. 32). A strong 
democratic approach necessarily requires the existence of 
institutions that foster these circumstances (Sclove, 1995, p. 37). 
At NGC, the success of narratives derived from the middle-
landscape myth is symptomatic of the impact of rhetoric about 
 
Adamczyk 28  Poroi 16,1 (May 2021) 
 
technology on the U.S. democratic institutions’ ability to deliberate 
about rhetoric from technology. Substantial evidence of the veiling 
ability of Big Data’s narrative dimensions arrived during June of 
2013, just over a month after NGC. At that time, Edward Snowden 
leaked documents detailing the U.S. government’s access to and 
gathering of private data. These practices immediately stunned the 
public and were hailed as “extremely unusual” (Greenwald, 2013). 
Violating privacy in this manner doubled back on the ubiquitous 
narratives that characterized data collection as virtuous 
stewardship that improves the well-being of the nation. Poignantly, 
permission was granted to the FBI to surveil Verizon’s call records, 
the data mining operation that was first to break headlines, on April 
25th, 2013—the day after rhetoric at NGC effectively hailed the use 
of Big Data as vital to the future of the nation. Clearly, public 
oversight had fallen victim to rhetoric about technology, and 
rhetoric from technology had been allowed to develop effectively 
unchecked.  
The potential susceptibility of congressional deliberation to 
rhetoric about technology qua narrative and myth—as 
demonstrated by my own analysis of NGC and by Gring-Pemble, 
Kauffman, and others—undermines congressional ability to foster a 
strong democratic approach, allowing one side of the 
nature/technology dichotomy to outweigh the other. Using 
culturally resonant narratives to justify Big Data allows its 
proponents to veil the implications of its technical affordances by 
dressing them up in utopian and ameliorative garb. Nye (2006) 
suggests that technology and narrative have an affinity with one 
another, as both require “the imagination of altered circumstances” 
and imply “a succession of events” (p. 3). An affinity between the 
technical processes of Big Data and the narrative possibilities of the 
middle-landscape myth stymies critical inquiry by situating the 
technic within an imagined landscape that reframes rhetoric from 
Big Data as culturally acceptable. Consequently, Big Data appears 
to be a technology that is discontinuous and unintegrated with 
previous technologies, despite the fact that it is necessarily built 
upon prior infrastructure and as such exudes the same rhetoric 
from technology and social implications (Hu, 2015, p. 2).  
Copyright © 2021 Christopher Lee Adamczyk. 
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